Waco

Part Six: “Flames Await”

On the morning of February 28th, 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms attempted to serve a search warrant against David Koresh and the rest of the Branch Davidians living in a compound just outside of Waco, Texas. However, in doing so, the ATF had lit a powder keg that had been building up in size and potency for months, if not years…

On the morning of February 28th, 1993, the ATF moved in to serve a search warrant against David Koresh and the rest of the Branch Davidians living in a compound just outside of Waco, Texas. However, in doing so, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had lit a powder keg... one that had been building up in size and potency for months, if not years. David Koresh had been anticipating the raid for some time, knowing that government agents had been circling him and the beleaguered church he was in charge of, looking for a way to bust him, specifically.

The ensuing shootout between the Branch Davidians and the ATF, along with members of other government entities (such as the DEA), lasted for approximately two hours, with the ATF side beginning to quiet after approximately 45 minutes. ATF Agent Chuck Hustmyre later wrote:

"About 45 minutes into the shootout, the volume of gunfire finally started to slacken. We were running out of ammunition. The Davidians, however, had plenty."

It was true. The Branch Davidians had spent years building up their arsenal, which included illegally-modified automatic firearms and thousands upon thousands of rounds of ammunition. They had also recently remodeled and fortified their compound for this explicit purpose, having been galvanized by David Koresh against the evil armies of Babylon (aka: the U.S. government). They were seemingly prepared for almost anything.

After two hours of shooting, the ATF retreated from the Branch Davidian compound. It was later learned that four ATF agents had been killed, and an additional sixteen were wounded. Many seriously. After fleeing the scene, the ATF had retreated back to an unplanned rallying point, near the intersection of Double E Road and FM 2491. Later, they took multiple buses back to the original staging area, which served as a command post for the foreseeable future.

Despite repelling the government agents, three Branch Davidians had died during the gunfight. Another two were mercy-killed later on by the Branch Davidians, having taken critical injuries that they were unable to treat. Yet that was not all; another would die later that afternoon, having been away from the compound that morning. Later that afternoon, he was shot and killed by ATF agents after attempting to bypass the government barricade. This brought the Branch Davidian dead up to six that day alone, February 28th.

In total, thousands of rounds of ammunition were fired, and the number of dead or wounded made this the largest gunfight on American soil since the Civil War.

In the days to come, footage from the failed raid would be played on national news, as the Branch Davidians dug themselves further into their compound, refusing to come out. Meanwhile, a confused response began to form outside, as dueling government agencies attempted to gain control of the situation... which seemed to be spiraling further into chaos with every passing hour...

Following their disastrous retreat, the ATF was left with a couple of difficult tasks; all of which required deft thinking, and had to be carefully handled at the same time.

First and foremost came the treatment of the injured agents, which was no easy feat because the ATF had not properly planned for such contingencies. Before the raid, they had only employed a single private ambulance, which was sitting by at the ready near the Branch Davidian compound. However, this was not enough to treat the more than one dozen agents that required a quick medical response.

At the same time, the ATF had to begin prepping for a secure perimeter in order to keep potential Branch Davidians from the outside area making their way to the compound with additional supplies or weapons. They also wanted to keep individuals like David Koresh from fleeing the scene, not knowing if he had an escape route planned for this specific purpose.

As the day wore on, the task of the perimeter would be taken over by other law enforcement agencies, such as the Austin, Waco, and Killeen Police Departments, the Texas Department of Public Safety, the McLennan County Sheriff's Department, and the U.S. Marshals Service.

ATF Agent Jim Cavanaugh had been negotiating with the Branch Davidians since the morning, when he had managed to agree upon a ceasefire with those inside the compound, and was able to get the deceased ATF agents' bodies removed from the property. He would remain in contact with the Davidians throughout the day; not only David Koresh, but Steve Schneider and Wayne Martin, both of whom were well-educated and respected members of the group that spoke for David in his absence.

Cavanaugh was able to continue negotiating through that evening, and was able to procure the release of six children later that evening. All were taken in by the ATF and immediately placed in the custody of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.

However, while this was ongoing, the situation at the impromptu ATF command post began to quickly deteriorate. The Bureau had been thrust into a position that it had not adequately prepared for - by any metric - and there was seemingly no one there to oversee a prolonged siege. In fact, no one seemed to have any idea what to do next. Some agents milled about, awaiting orders, while others were told to (or just assumed they could) go home.

Later that day, the decision was made to hand the situation over to the FBI; in particular, their Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), who were often tasked with bringing situations like this to a close. This was done in order to give the FBI all of the operational leeway necessary to resolve this conflict without having to deal with any bureaucratic headaches regarding permissions or structure. Officials with the FBI began to arrive at the scene en masse just hours later, in the afternoon and evenings hours of February 28th, 1993.

Jeffrey Jamar, the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI San Antonio office, was sent to Waco and named Site Commander for the time being, tasked with overseeing the ongoing situation unfolding there.

Richard "Dick" Rogers would arrive a short time later, serving in the role of the commander and supervisor of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). While Dick Rogers isn't a name you've heard at this point in this series, you have heard a little bit about his prior activities. Rogers was heavily involved in the government's response to the Ruby Ridge incident from the prior year (1992), which... did not end well, to put it lightly.

Dick Rogers was known to be aggressive with his tactics in order to achieve a quick and relatively-peaceful resolution. In Ruby Ridge, he had become known to override the Site Commander, and his tactics often butted heads with the FBI's negotiators... but more on that in a bit.

Jim Cavanaugh from the ATF had established a rapport with the Branch Davidians in the hours before the arrival of the FBI, and was tasked with remaining near the scene and continuing to negotiate alongside members of the FBI. By March 1st, the day after the failed raid, Cavanaugh was able to help oversee the release of ten children, and would remain close by to help guarantee the release of additional children later on.

Byron Sage of the FBI was chosen to be the chief negotiator for the FBI, but was joined by a number of others, including Gary Noesner. At first, Sage wanted to gauge whether this was destined to become Jonestown 2.0, but David Koresh and the other Branch Davidians inside insisted that they were not prepared to commit suicide. By all indications, that appears to have been true, but the government had no way to ensure that at the time, so repeat communication was their only guarantee.

Over the next couple of days, members of the FBI's HRT began to replace ATF agents at their posts, not only at the sprawling command center, but the perimeters, which were now pretty firmly established. For the rest of the siege, the ATF would play an auxiliary role, mainly support and security for the rest of the operation. This would end up spawning some resentment between members of the ATF, who viewed the FBI's HRT as dismissive of them or their losses, but thankfully led to no real (physical) disputes.

After establishing the FBI command post, a decision was made to move armored vehicles (provided by the National Guard the afternoon of the failed ATF raid) closer to the compound, in order to show the Branch Davidians the perimeter that had been established. At around the same time, telephone lines going out from the compound were re-routed. Now, the Branch Davidians - namely David Koresh - were no longer able to communicate with the outside world.

For approximately 24 to 36 hours after the ATF raid, David Koresh had been able to speak to radio stations and other news outlets. Not any more. Now all of their communications were directed exclusively to the FBI's negotiators, who were on-hand 24/7 in order to receive potential messages from David and the others.

Inside the compound, David Koresh slowly recovered from his wounds, having been shot twice in the initial burst of gunfire between his followers and the ATF.

In early negotiations, Koresh claimed that his two-year-old daughter had been shot and killed in the original shootout, but this would later be learned to be a lie meant to garner sympathy from the FBI negotiators. Later on, FBI spokesman stated, after referring to Koresh as a liar and a sociopath following repeated discussions with Branch Davidian Steve Schneider:

"And now we have been told by Mr. Schneider that no children were killed during the shootout with ATF."

In reality, no daughter of David Koresh's had been killed - let alone shot - on February 28th, 1993. But there were six Davidians who had died as a result of the violent shootout, and life inside the compound was forever-changed. But Koresh slowly recovered from his wounds after being provided with a suture kit that he and his supporters had been given by federal agents. And there, inside the compound, Koresh attempted to keep the calm by maintaining some kind of routine.

In the years prior to the raid, Koresh had tried to prepare his supporters for a frugal, often-meager life, glorifying scarcity and filling any empty time with Bible study. In the weeks to come, they would do a lot of studying the Bible, and tried to just carry on as usual.

Byron Sage, the FBI's primary negotiator, would later recall:

"... everybody was calm and content. There was no hysteria. And talking to David, it was clear that he was not a man in crisis. He was in his element."

A combination of David Koresh, Steve Schneider, Wayne Martin, and a few others would continue to communicate regularly with federal agents outside. In the weeks to come, Steve Schneider would begin to take on more of a leadership role within the Branch Davidian community, oftentimes speaking to negotiators for several hours on David's behalf.

That being said, things were not easy for the Branch Davidians inside the compound. While they had prepared for life under siege, they had to try and overcome certain disadvantages. As Davidian Clive Doyle later recalled to reporters with Texas Monthly:

"When we first went into this, none of us knew how long it was going to last. I don't think any of us thought, 'Let's make them mad by staying in here for as long as we can.' But we had enough provisions to hold out for a long time. We had a walk-in refrigerator with lots of fresh and frozen food, and once our electricity was cut and we had to eat that food in a hurry, we started rationing MREs. We had enough MREs to last a year. Even though the helicopters had shot up all our water tanks, we still managed to get the drinking water we needed. We stuck buckets out of windows and in secluded areas around the building where we couldn't get shot. Any rainwater that ran off the roof would fall into those buckets, and we rationed water to about half a glass a day per person."

Over the next few days, negotiations continued to take place, with things seeming to progress smoothly. The finer details weren't ironed out yet, but the lines of communication were open, and things seemed poised to resolve amicably.

Early on the morning of March 2nd, 1993, David Koresh agreed to surrender, as long as the government helped him distribute an hour-long audiotape he had put together. The government agreed to broadcast his teachings to a national audience, giving the tape over to the Christian Broadcasting Network, where it was played at 1:30 PM that day.

Despite giving into David's demand, negotiators were told hours later that the self-proclaimed messiah had received word from God, and was convinced not to surrender. He claimed that God had told him to "wait." In the days to come, Koresh would tell FBI negotiators that he was no longer dealing with "your bureaucratic system of government," but rather, "his Father." In his phone sessions with negotiators, Koresh would begin to deliver long, rambling sermons, talking frantically about his belief that he was "The Lamb" mentioned in the Bible, who was destined to unlock the Seven Seals and help establish the Kingdom of David.

In return, the negotiators learned more about his intricate soothsaying, and observed in real-time his ability to weave Biblical text with apocalyptic visions of the future. Among themselves, however, these negotiators began to refer to his zealous ramblings as "Bible babble."

Shortly after failing to follow through on his commitment, negotiations began to reach a standstill. However, despite this impasse, negotiators were able to convince the Branch Davidians to release even more children, bringing the total of kids released from the compound up to 19. Sadly, though, they didn't think that they'd be able to get many more children released, as the remaining dozen or so were the children of David Koresh.

At the same time, David demanded milk for the young kids inside, some of whom were too young for solid food. Of that, the Branch Davidians had more than enough to last for a time, having been seen purchasing large quantities of canned goods, juices, and grain by neighbors and residents of Waco in the months beforehand. But milk, being perishable, was not one of those, and government officials agreed to send in milk as their negotiations continued.

At around this time, a power struggle between the FBI's two leading strategies emerged.

On one side, you had the negotiators, who hoped to find a peaceful response by continuing to talk to the Branch Davidians. They had already ensured the release of nearly two dozen children, but had been betrayed by David at least once already, and he continued to show no sign of relenting. Certain government officials remained convinced that this situation could quickly devolve into a Jonestown 2.0 if not handled carefully, so the prospect of prolonged negotiation sat uneasy with them while news cameras remained parked at the perimeter, recording the ongoing government siege.

On the other side of the argument, you had the more tactical thinkers at the FBI's command post; in particular, Dick Rogers, commander of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team. He believed that a more aggressive approach might break the Branch Davidians, and quickly force them out of their compound. While some supported the aggressive stance, many in the FBI - primarily the negotiators - believed that an aggressive touch might only cement the Davidians' current position and make them even more difficult to negotiate with.

Byron Sage, the FBI's chief negotiator, later recalled to Texas Monthly:

"The tactical commander, Dick Rogers, had made the decision that his guys didn’t need to know what the negotiators were doing. He thought that it wasn’t any of their damn business. Their job was to keep their eyes on target and be ready to engage any hostile force that should exit the compound. So they never understood what we were trying to do. While they were lying in a bar ditch in March freezing their asses off, they thought we were a bunch of weak sisters who were back at the command post with, you know, the fireplace crackling. They thought that we had gone over to the dark side, that we sympathized with the same people who had just murdered four federal agents. At one of the tactical sites, I remember someone wrote inside a Port-A-Potty, 'Sage is a Davidian.'"

Throughout the first week or so of the government's siege, the negotiators took precedent. But on March 9th, 1993, the FBI's HRT began to put their thumb on the scale following several days of very little gains to the FBI. In the early morning hours, electricity to the compound was shut off, and armored vehicles began moving around the compound in a show of force. Reports from members of the HRT later noted that they had observed the Davidians installing firing ports in several windows, and they believed that the Davidians were continuing to fortify their compound in an effort to prolong the siege.

Immediately following this decision (which, it's worth noting, had been made without consulting the negotiators), negotiations between both sides were cut off for several days. Nothing was gained for either side.

Despite the aggressive stance seeming to have obtained no benefit for the FBI, SAC Jeff Jamar made the decision on March 12th to cut off power to the Branch Davidian compound for good. He believed that doing so ahead of a particularly cold night would cause those inside the compound to "experience the same wet and cold night as the tactical personnel outside." He and other FBI officials also hoped that this decision would challenge Koresh's control of the situation inside and increase stress levels inside the compound... making these people, who were already viewed as unreasonable by the FBI, even more stressed out, anxious, and paranoid.

The FBI's negotiators continued to insist that this would work against them.

Throughout this entire ordeal, details of the conflict were filtered through the highest levels of the U.S. government's executive branch.

President Bill Clinton had assumed the office of presidency approximately one month prior to the botched ATF raid, and in the weeks afterward, had been kept in the loop by FBI Director William Sessions. Sessions cautioned him to wait out the Branch Davidians, believing that the FBI perimeter would eventually result in the religious zealots caving and surrendering. At the time, Clinton agreed, deferring to Sessions, who had been appointed years prior by Clinton's predecessor, George H.W. Bush.

However, at the same time the government's siege of the Branch Davidians was unfolding, Clinton was in the midst of getting his chosen Attorney General, Janet Reno, approved through Congress. She had been named to the position in early February, weeks before the ATF's raid, but wasn't confirmed by the U.S. Senate until March 11th (when she was confirmed by a vote of 98-0). As a result, she ended up inheriting the ongoing siege in Waco as part of her new job, but would end up playing a major part in the ongoing saga.

Throughout the early weeks of the siege, a total of nineteen children had been released. Interviews with these children, conducted by members of the FBI as well as the Texas Rangers and various childhood trauma experts, revealed an alleged history of abuse. Not only physical abuse of the children by numerous Davidians, but sexual abuse of underage girls, some of whom had been claimed as David's many "wives." It was believed that abuse of this sort was continuing on in the Branch Davidian compound, as the conditions inside continued to deteriorate as a result of the government's siege.

In early March, the Davidians had released a videotape to the FBI, showing the children still inside the compound. Government officials, when viewing the footage, realized how bad it would look for them if this footage made its way out to the public; in doing so, it would likely garner a lot of public support for David Koresh and his supporters, and make the government's job in obtaining closure even more difficult.

While this wouldn't begin to manifest itself immediately, both concerns - the alleged child abuse inside the compound and the growing public support for the Branch Davidians - continued to weigh heavily on the minds of government officials in the weeks to come. In particular, Janet Reno, who was now in charge of the Justice Department... and whose decisions would trickle down to the FBI agents overseeing the government's effort in Waco, Texas.

After several days of beginning to turn away from the FBI's stance of prolonged negotiations, the Bureau's Hostage Rescue Team continued to turn the screws on the Branch Davidians on March 14th. Throughout the night, the HRT began shining floodlights on the compound in order to disrupt the sleep of those inside.

Shortly thereafter, the FBI would begin to adapt a "modified negotiation strategy," no longer wanted to indulge in any of David's sermons. Instead, whenever he or his supporters spoke to the FBI's negotiation squad, they were instructed to speak only about the X's and O's of getting more people to leave the compound peacefully. This would take the already-dwindled negotiating time each day down to less than an hour, with the government beginning to dig in even deeper, just as the Branch Davidians had been doing inside their compound for roughly two weeks now.

In the days to come, the FBI would begin to use loudspeakers to broadcast a message to those inside the compound: that any of the Branch Davidians inside would be safe if they surrendered. At least a handful of these individuals - men and women alike - would take the FBI up on their offer and leave the compound without issue.

A week after beginning to shine floodlights on the compound at night, the HRT increased their aggressive stance on March 21st. That night, they began playing loud music over the loudspeakers. At first, it was Tibetan monk chants, but later, the FBI began to employ more distressing sounds and abrasive music. This included recordings of jet planes, pop music, the screams of rabbits being slaughtered, slowed-down or sped-up music, Christmas carols, loud telephone rings, babies crying, even the Nancy Sinatra song "These Boots Are Made for Walkin.'"

Negotiators, whose jobs was made harder would express anger at this move, as would government officials and legal minds in the area. Namely, Assistant U.S. Attorney William Johnston from Waco, who wrote to Janet Reno and complained about the FBI's handling of the situation. Jack Zimmerman, an attorney representing Steve Schneider, would later state:

"The point was this - they were trying to have sleep disturbance and they were trying to take someone that they viewed as unstable to start with, and they were trying to drive him crazy. And then they got mad 'cos he does something that they think is irrational."

The loud noises and music would continue to play throughout the late evening and early morning hours, causing many of the Branch Davidians inside to cut off communication with the FBI's negotiators. For a time, this included Steve Schneider, who had been acting as the primary negotiator for the Davidians.

Eventually, the FBI would begin playing audio from prior negotiating sessions over the loudspeakers, in addition to messages from those that had left the compound and were being well-treated in the government's custody. They also played messages from family members and friends of those inside, meant to psychologically impact them and hopefully help draw them out.

While this seemed to work on a few, hope that this would lead to a mass exodus from the Branch Davidian compound wasn't long for this world. As recounted by FBI negotiator Gary Noesner to Texas Monthly:

"Effective negotiations ended, I believe, on March 23. That was the day the last adult came out. Nine people had come out over the span of two days, and it was a remarkable time for the negotiation team. I mean, we weren’t exactly ready to open champagne bottles, but we finally felt that what we were doing was working. In the wake of that, inexplicably, the tactical team went forward with tanks and crushed cars and knocked over water towers. The on-scene commander thought that Koresh had not let enough people out. You should reward positive behavior, not punish it—that’s Psychology 101. Yet that’s what happened. Negotiations continued, but in reality, the chances that we would succeed had become so slim by then that our goals had become almost unachievable."

On March 25th, the FBI's HRT offered up an ultimatum to David Koresh: at least ten people needed to leave the compound by 4:00 PM, or action would be taken. When nobody left, armored vehicles began moving around the property, crushing and removing the Davidians' motorcycles and go-carts. The following day, after another ultimatum was ignored by Koresh, the armored vehicles began flattening and destroying vehicles in front of the compound.

This was immediately followed by several days of no communication, let alone no negotiations. In order to break the ice afterward, the FBI offered David up (what they framed as) a bit of a peace offering: a chance to meet with Dick DeGuerin, noted criminal defense attorney, who would go on to defend Robert Durst in a murder trial the next year. DeGuerin had been hired by Koresh's family to represent him, and would meet with Koresh several times over the next couple of weeks.

Sadly, like the FBI negotiators, Dick DeGuerin was unable to arrange a peaceful surrender of Koresh or the rest of the Davidians.

Yet, in early April, word began circulating that the Branch Davidians were debating a total surrender after Passover, which ended on April 13th that year. However, despite hope that this was a real deadline being floated by Koresh , the FBI's HRT continued to broadcast loud music throughout the night. As a result, Koresh refused to confirm a surrender date, stating that he was waiting for God to tell him what to do. Until God told him to surrender, he wouldn't.

At this point, FBI officials began to grow convinced that Koresh was not going to willingly give in. And with pressure increasing from their higher-ups in the federal government, those on the ground began to discuss an exit strategy... a possible end to this frustrating saga.

On April 7th, 1993, high-ranking officials from the FBI met with Dick Rogers, head of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, in Waco, and began discussing the possibility of using tear gas to breach the compound and draw the Branch Davidians out.

[The substance being discussed wasn't actually known as "tear" gas, but rather, CS gas. For the sake of equal parts brevity and laziness, I'll just stick to the nomenclature of "tear gas" for now.]

Days later, on April 12th, the initial concept for this plan reached the desk of Janet Reno, the newly-appointed Attorney General for the U.S, who asked:

"Why now, why not wait?"

During several discussions with her top advisors, Reno was convinced that action was needed now, in order to prevent alleged abuse being perpetrated inside the Branch Davidian compound from continuing. These allegations had been compiled by government agents interviewing the Branch Davidian children and witnesses that had surrendered to authorities.

The plan that began to take shape was poised less as an all-out assault on the compound, but rather, a tactical use of tear gas in stages. Specifically, this plan would distribute tear gas throughout the compound in order to basically herd the Davidians inside out through certain exits, over a span of several hours, maybe even days, by essentially making parts of the compound unhabitable.

In case that failed, the tacticians on the ground in Waco had begun to formulate a potential backup plan to draw the Davidians out, which relied upon a much more aggressive stance than even the initial tear gas operation, and included risks that seem pretty apparent on their surface. A report later filed by the Justice Department described this backup plan as such:

"While it was conceivable that tanks and other armored vehicles could be used to demolish the compound, the FBI considered that such a plan would risk harming the children... [instead] walls would be torn down to increase the exposure of those inside."

So, basically: the government was going to fill up the Branch Davidian compound with tear gas, and if that didn't immediately work, begin tearing down walls one-by-one.

At this point, it seems like Janet Reno and other government officials didn't want to rely on this tear gas plan in any way, shape, or form. In fact, when she was given the chance to okay the orders a couple of days later, she rejected the proposal and tasked her advisors with finding out more information about the gas being used. Specifically, she wanted to know if the CS gas would prove to be an effective irritant to lure the Davidians out, and if it had any possible side effects; especially when it came to children, given that most gas masks don't fit their faces, and they were at most risk inside the compound.

However, Janet Reno's hesitancy to utilize this plan would begin to shift in the days to come, when David Koresh told negotiators that he wouldn't surrender until he had time to write a manuscript regarding the Seven Seals, and his role in exposing or opening them. This took place on April 14th, 1993, nearly two months after the siege had begun, and David would reportedly spend the next couple of days writing his manuscript for the First of these Seven Seals.

The government's patience at this point had grown rather thin, and they continued formulating a potential plan involving tear gas and armored vehicles. After all, David had already told them once before that he'd come out if they accommodated him, and he'd failed to follow through then. What made this any different?

In a statement made on April 15th, FBI spokesman Richard Swenson stated:

"We have had so many stalling tactics over such a long period of time we are not that overly optimistic."

After some negotiating, the FBI agreed to let David Koresh finish his manuscript... but they demanded to see proof that writing was actually being done. They needed to know that this wasn't just another stalling tactic, a way for David to buy time until the proverbial dam broke. However, after approximately four days, Branch Davidian Steve Schneider admitted to FBI negotiators that he - the supposed editor of this manuscript - had yet to see a single page from David.

On April 17th, Janet Reno would take another look at the proposed tear gas operation, and asked if the possible reactions (short-term and long-term) to CS gas, especially as it pertained to children, could be serious. At this time, she was assured by a civilian expert from an Army research center that:

"... although there had been no laboratory tests performed on children relative to the effect of the gas, anecdotal evidence was convincing that there would be no permanent injury."

Reno was also reportedly told that CS gas did not pose any kind of fire risk.

After a cursory review of the amended plans, Janet Reno approved them, and decided to leave the tactical decisions to those at Waco... where, it's worth noting, the federal government had gathered the largest military force ever assembled against American citizens. As described by the New Yorker, the government had compiled:

"... ten Bradley tanks, two Abrams tanks, four combat-engineering vehicles, six hundred and sixty-eight agents in addition to six U.S. Customs officers, fifteen U.S. Army personnel, thirteen members of the Texas National Guard, thirty-one Texas Rangers, a hundred and thirty-one officers from the Texas Department of Public Safety, seventeen from the McLennan County sheriff's office, and eighteen Waco police, for a total of eight hundred and ninety-nine people."

The following day, April 18th, Janet Reno would brief President Bill Clinton about the proposed operation involving tear gas, and Clinton would ask about the safety of the children, but ultimately deferred to his Attorney General, Janet Reno. The decision was in her hands.

Later that day, armored vehicles would begin to clear away the remaining vehicles from in front of the Branch Davidian compound, and the FBI would begin to send out verbal warnings to the Davidians inside, informing them to stay out of the watchtower. However, the Davidians would respond by reportedly holding children up in the windows, and a intricately-decorated sign made an appearance in one of the windows. Bearing just eleven letters, broken up into two words, it read:

"Flames Await"

A 1999 federal report compiled by the U.S. government regarding the Waco siege, included the following passage:

"The violent tendencies of dangerous cults can be classified into two general categories - defensive violence and offensive violence. Defensive violence is utilized by cults to defend a compound or enclave that was created specifically to eliminate most contact with the dominant culture. The 1993 clash in Waco, Texas at the Branch Davidian complex is an illustration of such defensive violence. History has shown that groups that seek to withdraw from the dominant culture seldom act on their beliefs that the endtime has come unless provoked."